Afghanistan doesn't need an introduction. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the invasion of that country was initially billed as necessary to ensure that Al Qaeda, and their Taliban supporters, are deprived of a safe haven, a failed state, from which to operate.
The statement of mission for NATO seems to have since evolved into the institution of democracy and the protection of populations at risk.
Years later, it is 2009, and the engagement in Afghanistan appears to have hit a snag. The enemies of NATO appear to be making a dent in the resolve of its member states, with little more than improvised explosives and other elements of guerrilla warfare, employed to devastating consequences.
There is even talk of seeking and executing an exit strategy.
The obvious question thus becomes what moves the enemies of NATO can make in an Afghanistan devoid of NATO's boots on the ground.
Would the entire country return to the grip of Al Qaeda and the Taliban?
Do alternatives exist?
A possible answer to that last question is a tentative “yes”.
Thus far, NATO has pursued a “clean war” (yes, an oxymoron, but an apt description for the purpose) policy in Afghanistan – boots on the ground, uniforms, camps, standard issue everything. In other words, clear targets for an enemy. The enemies of NATO are devoid of such trappings. They have pursued a “dirty war” policy – wear whatever, hit and run, improvise, wait, repeat. If there is a lesson from the engagement thus far in Afghanistan, it is that there is little wisdom in combining a clean war with a dirty war. The dirty warriors end up with full knowledge of the “centers” of the clean warriors, that is, their physical and psychological hubs, and can relentlessly pound at those from the shadows.
The prescription then, the alternative in the event that countries start pulling out their troops, is that the Afghanistan engagement move, from NATO's perspective, from clean war to dirty war. That would not entail the utilization of guerrilla tactics by NATO. It would entail utilizing NATO's clear technological advantage – drones, aerial surveillance and bombardment, special operations, laser and radar technology, robotics – in constantly seeking out and eliminating the leadership and middle cadres of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, who would have to come out of hiding to claim any price resulting from the withdrawal of NATO troops. It would entail working from afar to make Afghanistan impossible to possess, and impossible to publicly exist in, for the enemies of NATO.
The incremental downside of such a strategy for the civilian population might be minimal. Of course, the protections afforded by NATO would be absent, but those would be absent in the event of a withdrawal of troops in any event, and right now, that is exactly what many populations of the member countries of NATO are clamouring for. Further, rather than a full withdrawal, a decision could be taken to partially withdraw and strongly hold a portion of the country, perhaps Kabul along with a very large radius. It would be a place that can be defended, developed, emptied of weapons, controlled in order to eliminate insurgent activity, and made safe for civilian populations.
Thus, it would appear that the consideration of a dirty war approach, along with the partition of Afghanistan, are being urged. That appearance is correct. Simply consider the alternative. What would a full withdrawal and a full abandonment mean for the West?